Log for YSITD
function getData(keys, source) {
return Object.keys(source)
.filter(x => keys.includes(x))
.reduce((acc, cur) => {
acc[cur] = source[cur];
return acc;
}, {});
} // Pass
function getData(keys, source) {
return Object.keys(source)
.filter(keys.includes)
.reduce((acc, cur) => {
acc[cur] = source[cur];
return acc;
}, {});
} // TypeError: Cannot convert undefined or null to object includesfilter(fn) {
let newArr = [];
for (let item of this) {
if (fn(item)) {
newArr.push(item);
}
}
return newArr;
}
let newArr = [];
for (let item of this) {
if (fn(item)) {
newArr.push(item);
}
}
return newArr;
}
> a =[1,2]
[ 1, 2 ]
> a.includes
[Function: includes]
> let b = a.includes
undefined
> b
[Function: includes]
> b(1)
TypeError: Cannot convert undefined or null to object
at includes (<anonymous>)
> a.includes(1)
true
[ 1, 2 ]
> a.includes
[Function: includes]
> let b = a.includes
undefined
> b
[Function: includes]
> b(1)
TypeError: Cannot convert undefined or null to object
at includes (<anonymous>)
> a.includes(1)
true
===message===
text = 剛剛我把 OOXX 檔放進去了喔，這個檔案的 md5 是 md5(OOXX)
{{ text }}
A = md5(text)
signature = rsa_sign(private_key, A)
{{ A }} {{ signature }}
text = 剛剛我把 OOXX 檔放進去了喔，這個檔案的 md5 是 md5(OOXX)
{{ text }}
A = md5(text)
signature = rsa_sign(private_key, A)
{{ A }} {{ signature }}
然後我讀取message
B = md5(text)
A = rsa_verify(public_key, signature)
assert A == B
B = md5(text)
A = rsa_verify(public_key, signature)
assert A == B
現在有message.txt，alice想簽署它
alice的rsa公鑰是P1，私鑰是P2
h1 = hash(message.txt)
sig = rsa_sign(P2, h1)，保存到message.txt.sig
bob有alice的公鑰P1，收到了alice傳來的message.txt和message.txt.sig
bob這樣做
h2 = rsa_verify(P1, sig)
h1 = hash(message.txt)
如果h1 === h2，代表簽署正確，文件完好
alice的rsa公鑰是P1，私鑰是P2
h1 = hash(message.txt)
sig = rsa_sign(P2, h1)，保存到message.txt.sig
bob有alice的公鑰P1，收到了alice傳來的message.txt和message.txt.sig
bob這樣做
h2 = rsa_verify(P1, sig)
h1 = hash(message.txt)
如果h1 === h2，代表簽署正確，文件完好
假設bob簽了「eve有bob的金鑰」，但bob被eve黑掉的話 | bob是個智障的話 | bob被威脅的話，也不能證明eve真的有bob的金鑰
4c. Alice has the RSA key pair. Eve wants to forge that he has Alice's key. Bob asks Eve for the proof.
i) What message would Bob ask Eve to sign?
ii) Even if Eve got Alice signed the message and forwarded to Bob, does it prove Eve has Alice's key? Why?
i) What message would Bob ask Eve to sign?
ii) Even if Eve got Alice signed the message and forwarded to Bob, does it prove Eve has Alice's key? Why?
不過這樣問的話應該都答no了，真想坑人的話
If Bob claims to have Alice's RSA key pair, every message Bob sent has a valid signature from Alice. Does it prove that Bob have Alice's RSA key pair?
If Bob claims to have Alice's RSA key pair, every message Bob sent has a valid signature from Alice. Does it prove that Bob have Alice's RSA key pair?
是產生密碼PASS，再用不同人的RSA public key加密那密碼RSA_ENCRYPT(PUBK, PASS)
然後用AES加密crypt = AES_ENCRYPT(PASS, message)，把全部人的RSA_ENCRYPT(PUBK, PASS)加到header，內文就是crypt
然後用AES加密crypt = AES_ENCRYPT(PASS, message)，把全部人的RSA_ENCRYPT(PUBK, PASS)加到header，內文就是crypt
In cryptography, a zero-knowledge proof or zero-knowledge protocol is a method by which one party (the prover Peggy) can prove to another party (the verifier Victor) that she knows a value x, without conveying any information apart from the fact that she knows the value x.
所以，你的問題
X is a protocol where the message X(A, B) necessarily and sufficiently proves to B that sender has A's RSA key pair.
If Bob claims to have Alice's RSA key pair. Bob has sent X(Alice, e) for e in everyone. Does it prove that Bob have Alice's RSA key pair?
X is a protocol where the message X(A, B) necessarily and sufficiently proves to B that sender has A's RSA key pair.
If Bob claims to have Alice's RSA key pair. Bob has sent X(Alice, e) for e in everyone. Does it prove that Bob have Alice's RSA key pair?
@nekomata_saren 假設有 A B C 三人
A B C 三人都不知道自己的ID，但是別人都知道其他人的ID
B 有 priv_B 然後大家都知道 pub_B
那麼 A 要怎麼驗證 B 是否有 priv_B
A B C 三人都不知道自己的ID，但是別人都知道其他人的ID
B 有 priv_B 然後大家都知道 pub_B
那麼 A 要怎麼驗證 B 是否有 priv_B
eve想要向bob證明自己有alice的K
方法1: 把alice的任意加密訊息丟給bob - 不work，因為alice的訊息未必帶有認證關係
方法2: 把alice的「eve有alice的key」加密訊息丟給bob - work，因為訊息的確是由alice的key簽的，滿足認證關係的necessary condition (有key -> 能簽)
方法3: 把alice的協定X加密訊息丟給bob - work，滿足認證關係的necessary & sufficient condition (有key -> 能簽 + 能簽 -> 有key)
方法1: 把alice的任意加密訊息丟給bob - 不work，因為alice的訊息未必帶有認證關係
方法2: 把alice的「eve有alice的key」加密訊息丟給bob - work，因為訊息的確是由alice的key簽的，滿足認證關係的necessary condition (有key -> 能簽)
方法3: 把alice的協定X加密訊息丟給bob - work，滿足認證關係的necessary & sufficient condition (有key -> 能簽 + 能簽 -> 有key)